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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20090148-CA

vs.
JULLYN DOYLE,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE CUENCA WAS A MATERIAL WITNESS, MAKING HER
CREDIBILITY VITAL, THE STATE'S USE OF HER FALSE
TESTIMONY CREATED A REASONBLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE
JUDGMENT OF THE JURY WAS AFFECTED
The State erroneously claims that this Court need not decide whether the

prosecutor knowingly used [or relied on] false testimony because Defendant is not
entitled to relief where she fails to establish the requisite prejudice. See, Appellee Br. at
14. While the State concedes that a '"conviction procured by the knowing use of false
testimony is fundamentally unfair[,]'" it qualifies any remedy on whether such testimony
"'could have affected the judgment of the jury.'" Appellee Br. at 14 (quoting State v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984) and State v. Gordon, 8$6 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Utah Ct
App 1994)). Although true, Doyle need only to show that there is "any reasonable

1

likelihood" that the false statement could have affected the jury. State v. Gordon, 886
P.2d 112, 116 (Utah Ct. App 1994).
As Doyle pointed out in her brief, "[W]hen a prosecutor is aware that testimony is
false, he or she has a duty to correct the false impression; failure to do so requires
reversal' if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury.'" Appllant Br. at 16. State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 116 (Utah
Ct. App 1994) (quoting Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981) (emphasis
added)).

Notably, this Court has added that "[t]his applies even if the prosecutor

unwittingly introduced the false testimony...." Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116. This case
presents such a scenario.
Here, there appears to be no dispute that Cuenca's statements were false and the
prosecutors knew, or at least should have known, that those statements were false. The
State, however, claims that this Court need not decide whether the prosecutors failed to
correct this false testimony because Defendant "fails to establish the requisite prejudice."
Appellee Br. at 14. Defendant asserts that the nature and circumstance surrounding
Cuenca's testimony dictate that there was indeed a "reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116.
a. The Nature and Circumstances of Cuenca's Testimony Dictates that
her False Statements Could Have Reasonably Affected the Judgment
of the Jury
It's undisputed that the State elicited and, by not correcting it, relied on a false
statement of a material witness - Cuenca. The State is apparently claiming a no harm, no
foul scenario in stating that "because the record demonstrates that Cuenca's plea-related
2

statements were fully explained, evaluated, and argued by the parties during the trial,
alleviating any possible prejudice that may have otherwise arisen...[.]" Appellant Br. at
15. The record shows, however, that Cuenca's credibility was crucial evidence; that the
State never mitigated or corrected the false testimony; and that it was Doyle that was
forced by the State's inaction to correct the false statement through impeachment.
Therefore, under these circumstances, a reasonable likelihood existed that Cuenca's false
statements could have affected the judgment of the jury. Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116.
Cuenca, the only eyewitness and thus a momentous witness, made trial statements
the prosecutors knew, or at least should have known, to have been false certainly creates
a "reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury." Gordon, 886 P.2d, at 116. The basis for which the jury's judgment could have
been reasonably affected is grounded in the prosecutor's failure to comply with their
affirmative duty to correct false testimony. This failure permitted the jury to hear and
consider false information that would have otherwise impeached Cuenca's motive to
testify as she did.
The State believes that no harm resulted from the prosecutor's failure to correct
false testimony because defense counsel took the initiative to call Cuenca's attorney,
Gunda Jarvis, to testify regarding the plea deal and introduced both written plea
agreements from Cuenca's criminal cases. Appellee Br. at 16-17. The fact remains,
however, that the prosecutors still failed to correct Cuenca's false testimony - testimony
that goes directly to motive to lie about Doyle's involvement.

3

In her Brief, Doyle addressed the circumstances which show how critical Cuenca's
testimony was at trial - this criticality goes to show that her false testimony could create a
reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury's assessment of the evidence.
Considering the prosecution's theory that Doyle constructively possessed the
contraband (R. 341, Jury Instruction #9), Cuenca's testimony that Doyle did in fact
possess the contraband makes Cuenca's testimony crucial.

As such, it becomes

imperative that Doyle have the opportunity to present to the jury any motive Cuenca
would have to lie; to wit: plea agreements with the State in exchange for testimony
against Doyle.
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court addressed the gravity of prosecutors failing to correct false
evidence, even when unsolicited. In Giglio, the defendant appealed his conviction of
passing forged money orders, arguing that the prosecution failed to disclose its promise to
Mr. Taliento, the government's key witness, that he would not be prosecuted if he
testified for the government. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150-51.
Relying on its analysis of basic principles of due process, the Court reiterated that
it had been "made clear that that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the
presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of
justice." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153 (internal quotations omitted). It further added that such
is the case even "when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears." Id. (citing Naupe v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173,
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3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (holding that the false testimony usfed by the State in securing the
conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.)).
In Giglio, the circumstances were such that the Court had to consider the evidence
presented to the jury, specifically the credibility of the key witness in light of the
existence of a possible plea deal in exchange for testimony. The Court stated that
"[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule."
Giglio, 405 U.S., at 154 (citing Naupe, 360 U.S., at 269), Considering the gravity of
false testimony - regarding a plea agreement - gone uncorrected, the Court held that the
government's failure to produce the information of a plea arrangement to the defense and
the critical nature of the key witness's testimony was grounds, under due process
requirements, for a new trial. Giglio, 405 U.S., at 154-55.
Similarly, the government's prosecutors failed to correct false testimony and did
not provide defense counsel with crucial plea agreements. Here, the fact that the jury
was led to believe, by the prosecutor's failure to correct testimony, that Cuenca did not
have a motive to lie (because the jury was unaware of any plea agreements) certainly
created the likelihood that the jury would use Cuenca's testimony, in light of all the
evidence, to convict Doyle. Like in Giglio and Naupe, "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence
affecting credibility falls within this general rule." Giglio, 405 U.S., at 154 (citing
Naupe, 360 U.S., at 269).

5

b. Regardless of Any Possible Harm, the Fact Remains that the
Prosecutors Failed to Do Their Duty and Correct the False Testimony
Aside from the possible harm done through Cuenca's false testimony, the
prosecutors still failed to comply with their duty to correct false testimony.l While the
State's Brief focuses on the effect of the harm (whether it could have affected the jury's
judgment), it fails to address the underlying issue: that the prosecutors still failed to
comply with their duty to correct false testimony.
Two critical facts present themselves here: (1) it was defense counsel that
affirmatively tried to correct Cuenca's false statements - not the prosecutors; and (2) the
prosecutors did not address this issue until closing arguments, which is insufficient.
First, the State's prosecutors failed to correct Cuenca's false statements. "As the
State's representative, the prosecutor has a duty to 'see that justice is done.'" State v.
Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah Ct. App 1994) (quoting State v. Walker, 624 P.2d 687,
691 (Utah 1981)). Accordingly, it is the prosecutor's duty to correct false statements. Id.
at 116. That did not occur in this case.
The State acknowledges that Cuenca testified, on dired examination by the State
and cross-examination by defense counsel, that she had not been given a plea deal in
exchange for her testimony. See, Appellant Br. at 15-16. The State further concedes that
it was defense counsel that called Cuenca's attorney to testify regarding the plea deal, and
that it was defense counsel that introduced the plea agreements into evidence. See,

1

Regardless of this Court's findings as to whether there was a reasonable likelihood of
the false testimony affecting the jury's judgment, Doyle asks this Court to admonish the
prosecutors in failing to comply with their duty to correct Cuenca's duty.
6

Appellant's Br. at 16. The only action taken by the prosecutors that could have
comported with their duty to correct the false statement was that they acknowledged the
plea deal. See, Appellant's Br. at 16. That action, however, occurred during closing
arguments.
Second, any attempt by the prosecutors to correct the false testimony did not occur
until closing argument. Specifically, the prosecution closed with:
Now, defense counsel had pointed out a little pit of problem with Ms.
Cuenca's testimony. She's pointed out that she testified that she didn't get
a deal in this case. We've shown that that's not true. Defense counsel
showed that that's not true. She did get a deal in this case. We stipulated
to the deals that she did get in this case.
(R. 473: 388). The prosecutors admittedly did nothing more than concur with the
evidence that Cuenca lied, but only did so after defense counsel brought the false
testimony to light. The fact that defense counsel was forced to reveal the truth is
axiomatic; however, to give the prosecutors credit for complying with their duty under
these facts, if it is compliance at all, creates an exception that swallows the rule; it
enables prosecutors to remain non-compliant and benefit from false testimony until called
out. That result would be antithetical of the role that prosecutors play in our justice
system, which is to see "see that justice is done." State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115
(Utah Ct. App 1994) (internal quotation omitted).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S 404(B) ANALYSIS WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
THE POINT THAT ITS RULING WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
When analyzing admissibility of bad-acts evidence, a trial court must determine:

(1) whether evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character purpose; (2) whether
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such evidence is relevant; and (3) whether evidence must be excluded as more prejudicial
than probative. Utah R. Evid. 402, 403 and 404(b); see also, State v. Rees, 2004 UT App
51, t 2, 88 P.3d 359 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, t 20, 993 P.2d 837, cert
denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1181 (2002)). Here, the trial court's perfunctory 404(b)
analysis was insufficient to justify the admission of Doyle's prior bad acts and was
therefore an abuse of discretion
a. Evidence of Prior Drug Usage was Not Admitted for Anything But to
Show Doyle's Bad Character or Propensity to Use Drugs
The crux of a 404(b) analysis begins with whether the prior bad acts are being
offered for a "proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, *{ 17, 108 P.3d
730; cf., Utah R. Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith."). As the State has argued, "Bad acts evidence is admissible under this first
prong so long as it is relevant to show something other than Defendant's bad character."
Appellant's Br. at 19. Here, the trial court abused its discretion because the prior bad acts
only tend to show Doyle's conformity therewith.
Here, the State argues that the trial court's analysis under this first prong was
sufficient. In denying Doyle's motion, the trial court found that the "State is seeking to
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes - i.e., to show ownership or
possession of the methamphetamine..., to establish that the items founds...are in fact
drug paraphernalia..., and other non-character purposes."

(R. 240-42).

The State's

rationale to justify this finding is that "[w]ith Defendant's possession, intent, and use of
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the meth and paraphernalia at issue below, the State appropriately looked to Defendant's
prior use of meth to help establish these elements." Appellant's Br. at 22. Ownership or
possession, however, are insufficient grounds to permit prior bad acts under a 404(b)
analysis.
Although the types of non-character purposes are "not exhaustive[,]" the basis for
allowing proof of prior drug possession or use to show present possession or use is
indisputably propensity evidence. State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 17. While 404(b)
evidence may concurrently show the defendant's propensity to commit the imputed act,
that evidence is not admissible, however, "if it is relevant solely to show a defendant's
propensity to commit a crime." State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah 1985); also,
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11,117.
Here, the State argues that:
Although [evidence of prior possession or use] would be inadmissible to
establish her propensity to use meth, it was offered and admitted for the
alternative noncharacter purpose of helping to establish the contested issue
of whether she possessed, used or intended to use the meth and
paraphernalia in this case.
Appellant's Br. at 22. The State goes on to argue that approximately eighteen months
before this case, Doyle had admitted to police that she used methamphetamines and
tested positive, as well as having been charged with DUI for meth. Appellant's Br. at 23.
Accordingly, the State concludes that "[t]ogether, the evidence suggest not only that
Defendant had a drug habit, but an active meth habit..., and that her use of the drug was
deliberate or intentional as opposed to mistaken or accidental." Appellant's Br. at 23.

9

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "propensity" as "an often intense natural
inclination or preference."

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010.

Merriam-

Webster Online. Here, the trial court as well as the State's reasoning for admitting the
evidence does not qualify as a non-character purpose. Doyle contends that the inference
to be drawn from the trial court's and the State's reasoning is: 2 it is a legitimate noncharacter purpose to introduce past possession in order to prove present possession. That
conclusion, however, goes directly against the purpose behind excluding prior bad acts.
See, State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, t 23, 8 P.3d 1025 ("persons can be convicted for acts
committed and not because of general character or proclivity to commit bad acts").
Consequently, because the prior bad acts demonstrated only her propensity to possess or
use drugs, the trial court abused it discretion.
b. Evidence of Prior Drug Possession or Use was Irrelevant Because it
Only Shows Doyle's Proclivity to Commit the Offense Alleged
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401. The State claims that
evidence of prior meth use "make it more probable that Defendant possessed, used, or
intended to use the charged items." Appellant's Br. at 23. In reliance, the State cites

2

In its ruling, the trial court indicated that the prior bad acts were admissible for the noncharacter purpose to show ownership or possession.. ."and other non-character purposes."
This latter justification is conclusory. By providing no other justification for the
admission of the evidence, the trial court's ruling was superficial and thus an abuse of
discretion.
10

State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073, for the general proposition that prior bad acts
are relevant and thus admissible evidence. Bisner, however, is distinguishable.
In Bisner, the defendant was convicted of two, first-degree felonies: murder and
aggravated robbery.

Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^j 1. At trial the State was permitted to

introduce, over defendant's objection, evidence of a drug debt owed by Golub to Bisner.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admissiojti of the evidence, stating that
the evidence "tended to prove the material fact of Bisner's motive by presenting the jury
with a reason Bisner had to kill Golub." Id. at ^ 58. While Doyle does not contend the
logic in Bisner, its holding is inapplicable here.
In Bisner, the court allowed evidence of a drug debt to show motive or intent to
kill, not that Bisner had motive or intent to sell more drugs. The Utah Supreme Court has
held that "even if otherwise relevant as defined by rule 401, evidence is irrelevant and
inadmissible under rule 402 if the evidence is material and relevant to prove only the
defendant's proclivity to commit the crime charged." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^j
32, 52 P.3d 1194. The State argues that the prior bad acts are relevant because it "tended
to make it more probable that Defendant possessed, used, or intended to use the charged
items." Appellant's Br. at 23; R: 240-42 (trial court finding that evidence is relevant
"because it tends to [show]...the possession or ownership of the drugs - more or less
probable....").
Again, basis for admitting the prior bad acts plainly appears to be propensity
evidence - attempting to show that because Doyle used or possessed methamphetamines
in the past, it is more probable that she intended to use or possess the drug in this

11

instance. Consequently, because the evidence is "relevant to prove only the defendant's
proclivity to commit the crime charged[,]" it was an abuse of discretion to find that the
evidence was relevant. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^f 32.
c. The Trial Court Incorrectly Considered and Applied the Shickles
Factors to Determine Unfair Prejudice
Even if this Court were to find that the evidence was presented for a legitimate
non-character purpose and was relevant, under the Shickles factors, this Court should find
that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.
First, the State contends that the "need for the evidence is great inasmuch as
Defendant's meth use is highly probative of the charged crime and essential to a case
built largely on circumstantial evidence." Appellant's Br. at 26. In support, the State
cites State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) and State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). Both cases are different from this, in that the basis for allowing the prior
bad acts was to establish a "common plan of marijuana distribution^]" Taylor, 818 P.2d,
at 570, and "motive and identity." Shaffer, 725 P.2d, at 1309. While Taylor and Shaffer
deal with circumstantial evidence and the theory of constructive possession, the State's
"need for the evidence" should be given little weight while considering all the Shickles
factors.
Undeniably, it is more difficult to prove that a person constructively possessed
contraband than it would be under normal "possessory" circumstances - e.g., the item
was found in the person's immediate physical possession. Doyle contends that because
the State has chosen to proceed under a more difficult theory, it should not be granted

12

evidentiary leniency as suggested. Appellant's Br. at 26. Accordingly, little weight
should be given to the "need of the evidence" factor in determining prejudice.
Second, the State notes that Doyle does not suggest "that there is any better or
more effective alternative proof regarding the likelihood that she constructively possessed
the meth and paraphernalia."

Appellant's Br. at 26. In considering the "efficacy of

alternative proof," the prosecution had a key witness - Cuetica - who testified to Doyle's
alleged possession and/or use of the drugs. Considering the strength of an eye witness
seriously diminishes the need to use prior bad acts.
Third, the State erroneously asserts that "[e]ven the mere fact that Defendant
drove while under the influence of meth, without more, seems highly unlikely to inspire
overmastering hostility." Appellant's Br. at 26 (internal quotations omitted). The fact
that the present offense and the prior offenses are substantively similar - use of
methamphetamines while driving - there is a greater likplihood that the jury would
harbor feelings of hostility.
In State v. Allen, the defendant appealed his jury conviction of aggravated murder,
in part, on the basis that evidence of a lesser offense involving fraud was introduced
under Utah Rules of Evidence, 404(b). Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 33. In its analysis, the
court concluded that "is unlikely that Allen's involvement in fraudulent activities would
have roused the jury to overmastering hostility, especially in light of the gravity of the
offenses for which he was charged." Allen suggests that the disparity between the prior
bad act and the present offense may determine whether a jury is aroused to overmastering
hostility. In Allen, because the prior act was nearly insignificant compared to the alleged
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crime - murder - the jury would not be as inclined to be emolionally charged and punish
the defendant for his prior wrongs.
Conversely, the disparity between Doyle's prior acts and present offense are
nearly indistinguishable. Because the underlying facts in the prior and present acts were
that Doyle possessed and/or used methamphetamines, a jury would be more inclined to
punish her for any perceived, continual drug use; especially when the prior acts involved
use of drugs while driving a vehicle on public roads.
Last, the trial court's findings were conclusory and unsupported by findings
sufficient to claim that the trial court properly considered the Shickles factors. In State v.
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 18, 993 P.2d 837, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
"admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges
in the proper exercise of that discretion." See also, State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT
59, 6 P.3d 1120 (affirming that appellate courts review the record to determine whether
the admission of other bad acts evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial judge in
the proper exercise of that discretion.). The trial court fails in this respect.
Here, the trial court's cursory analysis and conclusion states: "The Court notes
that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but Rule
403 only excludes 'unfair prejudice.' The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial and is therefore proper." (R. 240-42). There is no indication that the trial
court conducted a "scrupulous examination," as demanded by Decorso, of all of the
factors when considering whether to permit 404(b) evidence. Thus, the trial court abused
its discretion by admitting such evidence. Cf. State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ^ 38,
14

227 P.3d 1264 (finding that the trial court "carefully and thoroughly assessed the
necessary [Shickles] factors...").
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons,, Doyle respectfully requests that this Court vacate her
conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the 404(b)
evidence and a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

MicTiael S. Brown
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 2nd day of August, 2010.
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Addendum - A
Trial Court's Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Prior Bad Acts
Evidence (R. 240-42)

:>

V

JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, No. 7041
Utah County Attorney
RYAN V. PETERS, No. 10683
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 851-8026

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

v.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE PRIOR BAD ACTS
EVIDENCE

JULLYN DOYLE,

Case No. 071402824

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Judge Darold J. McDade

This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Prior
Bad Acts. Having been fully briefed and argued before the Court, the Motion is ripe for decision.
The State put the defendant on notice that it intends to introduce the following bad acts
evidence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b) at trial:
1.

A 2006 DUI conviction wherein the defendant was convicted of driving while
under the influence of methamphetamine.

2.

Statements made by the defendant when she was arrested in 2006 for DUI to the
effect that she had consumed methamphetamine.

2

3.

Toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing the presence of
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood.

4.

Toxicology report from an August 2007 arrest for DUI, showing the presence of
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood.

The defendant moved to exclude such evidence claiming the evidence is improper under Rule
404(b).
"In deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial
court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3)
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v, Cox, 169 P.3d 806, 813
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
The Court denies the defendant's motion based upon the following:
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of other bad acts to establish character
that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case. Rather, the State is seeking to
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes-i.e., to show ownership or possession of the
methamphetamine found in this case, to establish that the items found with the drugs are in fact
drug paraphernalia (as expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes.
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402 because it tends to
make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter-the possession or ownership of the
drugs-more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See URCrP 401.

Mi

Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudicial effect. The
Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but
Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice." The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial and is therefore proper.
Therefore, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion to exclude the prior bad acts
mentioned in this order and the State may introduce the same at trial.
Dated this day:

f^bru^h
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BY THE COURT*

Addendum - B
Jury Instruction #9 (R. 341)

INSTRUCTION NO. 9
Possession of a controlled substance and /or drug paraphernalia can be actual or
constructive. To find that the defendant had constructive possession of the controlled substance,
it is necessary to prove that there was a sufficient connection between the defendant and the
controlled substance to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over the controlled substance. Whether a sufficient connection
exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. While no exhaustive checklist of
factors govern in determining whether the connection in a particular case is sufficient, several of
the following combined factors may be useful:
1. Ownership or occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the controlled substance
was found;
2. Presence of a defendant at the time the controlled substance was found;
3. Defendant's or other's proximity to the controlled substance;
4. Defendant's or other's previous drug use;
5. Incriminating statements or behavior;
6. The presence of a controlled substance in a specific area where the defendant had
control.
A person who might know the whereabouts of a controlled substance and who might have
access to it but who has no intent to obtain and use the drugs cannot be found to have possessed a
controlled substance. Knowledge and ability, although required to convict, are not by themselves
enough for a conviction. There must be facts which show that the person intended to use the
drugs as his own.
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